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Abstract
Shor proposed a polynomial time algorithm for prime factorization on quantum computers. For a given
number N, he gave an algorithm for ﬁnding the order r of an element x in the multiplicative group (mod N).
The method succeeds because factorization can be reduced to ﬁnding the order of an element using random-
ization. But the algorithm has two shortcomings, the order of the number must be even and the output might
be a trivial factor. Actually, these drawbacks can be overcome in a particular case, i.e.,N is an RSAmodulus.
In this paper, we propose a new quantum algorithm for factoring RSAmodulus without the two drawbacks.
Moreover, we show that the cost of the algorithm mainly depends on the calculation of ordN (2).
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1. Introduction
Factoring integers is generally thought to be hard on a classical computer. But it is now held that
prime factorization can be accomplished in polynomial time on a quantum computer. This remark-
able work is due to PeterW. Shor [1]. For a given numberN , he gave a quantum computer algorithm
for ﬁnding the order r of an element x in the multiplicative group (mod N ). The method succeeds
because factorization can be reduced to ﬁnding the order of an element using randomization [2].
We now brieﬂy give this reduction [1].
To ﬁnd a factor of an odd number N , given a method for computing the order r of x, choose a
random x (mod N ), ﬁnd its order r, and compute gcd(xr/2 − 1,N). The Euclidean algorithm can be
used to compute gcd(xr/2 − 1,N) in polynomial time. Since (xr/2 − 1)(xr/2 + 1) = xr − 1 ≡ 0 (mod
N ), the numbers gcd(xr/2 − 1,N) and gcd(xr/2 + 1,N) will be two factors of N . This procedure fails
only if r is odd, in which case r/2 is not integral, or if xr/2 ≡ −1 (modN), in which case the procedure
yields the trivial factors 1 and N . Using this criterion, it can be shown that this procedure, when
applied to a random x (mod N), yields a nontrivial factor of N with probability at least 1− 1/2k−1,
where k is the number of distinct odd prime factors of N .
We ﬁnd that in Shor’s algorithm, the order of the numbermust be even and the output might be a
trivial factor of N . Actually, these drawbacks can be overcome in a particular case, i.e., N is an RSA
modulus. One phenomenon might be observed that existing prime factorization algorithms [3–8] as
well asShor’s quantumalgorithmall aim to factor arbitrarynumbers.Noneof thempaysmoreatten-
tion to some numbers of a particular structure, especially, product of two primes. But those numbers
are of great importance in public key cryptography. They are usually called RSAmodulus.
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for factoring RSA modulus on quantum computers.
The algorithm overcomes the two drawbacks of Shor’s algorithm. Another special merit of the
algorithm is that it only needs to compute the order of 2 relative to N . But we should emphasize
that computing ordN (2) does not currently have a fast efﬁcient classical algorithm.
2. Preliminary
Let N = pq be a product of two distinct odd primes, 
(·) be Euler Totient Function. We know

(N) = (p − 1)(q− 1) = pq− p − q+ 1
Hence,
N −
(N)+ 1 = p + q
Considering the following equation
x2 −Mx + N = 0 (∗)
where M is undetermined, we obtain two roots
x1 = M +
√
M 2 − 4N
2
, x2 = M −
√
M 2 − 4N
2
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If
M = N −
(N)+ 1
then equation (∗) can be rewritten as
x2 − (p + q)x + pq = 0
Therefore,
x1 | N , x2 | N
If
M /= N −
(N)+ 1
then neither x1 nor x2 is an integer (since x1x2 = pq).
By the above discussion, we have:
Theorem 1. If N = pq is a product of two distinct odd primes, and M /= N + 1, then
M +√M 2 − 4N
2
∣∣∣∣∣ N ⇐⇒ M = N −
(N)+ 1.
Proof.⇐) It is trivial.
⇒) Since N = pq is a product of two distinct odd primes and
M +√M 2 − 4N
2
∣∣∣∣∣ N
without loss of generality, we assume that
M +√M 2 − 4N
2
= p
Hence
M +
√
M 2 − 4N = 2p
M 2 − 4N = 4p2 − 4pM +M 2
Therefore, M = p + q = N −
(N)+ 1. 
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3. A quantum algorithm for factoring RSA modulus
3.1. The new algorithm
Denote by ordN (2) the order of 2 relative to N , where N is a product of two distinct odd primes.
Obviously,
ordN (2) | 
(N)
Set s :=
[
N
ordN (2)
]
, where [x] denotes the integral part of number x. Clearly,

(N)  s× ordN (2)
Therefore,

(N) ∈ {ordN (2), 2× ordN (2), . . . , (s− 1)× ordN (2), s× ordN (2)} .
It is well known that
(N)must be kept in secret. How to search for
(N) in the set {ordN (2), 2×
ordN (2), . . . , (s− 1)× ordN (2), s× ordN (2)}? In the following, we design a quantum algorithm
based on Theorem 1, which takes advantage of the relation between computing 
(N) and fac-
toring N . The algorithm succeeds in computing 
(N) and factoring N synchronously.
A quantum algorithm for factoring RSA modulus
(1) Input N , compute ordN (2) using Shor’s quantum algorithm.
(2) s ←
[
N
ordN (2)
]
.
(3) M ← N − s× ordN (2)+ 1.
(4) If M 2 − 4N is not a square, then s ← s− 1, goto step (3).
(5) t ← M+
√
M 2−4N
2 , if t is not an integer, then s ← s− 1, goto step (3).
(6) Output t, N/t.
How much time does this algorithm take? Apart from the time of computing ordN (2) in step (1),
it seems that the running time of the algorithm mainly depends on the number of iterations of the
loop, i.e., the value of s. In fact, it only depends on the upper bound for
p + q− 1
ordpq(2)
If
p + q− 1
ordpq(2)
 k
where k is an integer, then above loop will terminate in at most k iterations.
Further, we know that p and q are usually safe primes in practice, i.e.,
p = 2p ′ + 1, q = 2q′ + 1
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where p ′ and q′ are primes. Apart from the special case ordpq(2) = 4, we have
k 
p + q− 1
p ′
= 2p
′ + 2q′ + 1
p ′
Usually, p ′ and q′ are of the same scale. So, k  4. This means the number of iterations in the
algorithm is very small.
As for to check whetherM 2 − 4N is a square, easy! So, the cost of the algorithm depends almost
on the calculation of ordN (2).
3.2. Comparison
We nowmake a comparison between the original algorithm and the new algorithm for factoring
RSA modulus as follows.
The original algorithm The new algorithm
1. Randomly choose x, compute 1. Compute the order l
the order l of x relative to N . of 2 relative to N .
2. If l is not even goto step 1. 2. s ←− [Nl
]
.
3. Compute D1 = gcd(xl/2 + 1,N) 3. M ←− N − s× l+ 1.
and D2 = gcd(xl/2 − 1,N).
4. Output D1,D2. 4. If M 2 − 4N is not a square, then
s ←− s− 1, goto step 3.
Comment: It might fail to 5. t ←− M+
√
M 2−4N
2 ,
output nontrivial factors of N . if t is not an integer,
then s ←− s− 1, goto step 3.
6. Output t,N/t.
4. Conclusion
It’s interesting to ﬁnd that the cost of our algorithm mainly depends on the calculation of the
order of 2 relative to N . We also observe that the number 2 is the base of binary system. How to
compute the order of 2 relative to N on classical computers? Given a number x, we all know that to
compute the order of x relative to an RSA modulus N (whose factors are kept in secret) is hard on
classical computers. How about the special number 2? We know (2ordN (2) − 1)2 is a repunit, i.e.,
(N)2 + (N)2 + · · · + (N)2 = (11 · · · 1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ordN (2)
There is only a binary additive operation in above expression. Now, what interests us is how to
design a special equipment instead of a quantum computer to compute ordN (2) in polynomial time.
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